Most existing models of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) adopt centralized training with decentralized execution framework. We demonstrate that the decentralized execution scheme restricts agents' capacity to find a better joint policy in team competition games, where each team of agents share the common rewards and cooperate to compete against other teams. To resolve this problem, we propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel coordination module that can be integrated with most existing models. SIC casts a common signal sampled from a pre-defined distribution to team members, and adopts an information-theoretic regularization to encourage agents to exploit in learning the instruction of centralized signals. Our experiments show that SIC can consistently improve team performance over wellrecognized MARL models on matrix games and predatorprey games.
Introduction
Multi-agent systems (Lowe et al. 2017) are common in many real-world scenarios, e.g., complex games and social dilemmas. Recently, there is a growing interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) where learning paradigms are proposed to apply reinforcement learning algorithms in multi-agent systems. A straightforward approach is to adopt a fully centralized method which regards all agents as one and apply successful single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. However, the fully centralized method suffers from exponential growth of the size of the joint action space with the number of agents. On the contrary, the fully decentralized method models each participant as an individual agent with its own policy and critic. This setting fails to solve the non-stationary environment problem (Lanctot et al. 2017; Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) , and is empirically deprecated by (Foerster et al. 2016; Li 2018 ). An alternative paradigm between them is centralized training with decentralized execution (Oliehoek, Spaan, and Vlassis 2008; Lowe et al. 2017) , where each agent learns an individual policy and a centralized critic. During the training stage, the centralized critic conditions its value estimation on joint observations and actions of all agents, and only decentralized policies are used in the decision making stage. This training paradigm bypasses the non-stationary problem , and is adopted by a bunch of recent models (Lowe et al. 2017; Foerster et al. 2018b; Das et al. 2018; Iqbal and Sha 2018; Rashid et al. 2018; Son et al. 2019) .
We argue that in a common variant of mixed cooperativecompetitive environments, team competition games, where two teams of agents cooperate to compete against each other, the popular decentralized decision making scheme restricts agents' ability to find a better joint policy. In team competition, all agents within a team share a common reward that is opposite to that of the other team, and both teams aim to reach Nash equilibria with higher expected returns. We demonstrate that in a decentralized scheme, a team of agents can only explore strategies in a joint policy space smaller than the meta-policy space in the fully cooperative approach, and consequently, miss the chance to reach better Nash equilibria with higher returns. Therefore, it is meaningful to find a better algorithm that maintains the decentralized scheme framework for ease of training and enables agents to explore in larger policy space for higher game values in competition.
In this paper, we propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel plug-in module for learning coordinated policies in the centralized training with decentralized execution paradigm. For each team, SIC samples a common signal from a pre-defined distribution, and casts it to all team members to coordinate their decentralized policies. As all agents in a team receive the same signal, they are capable of inferring policies of other teammates and make decisions accordingly. Theoretically, when the space of possible signals is sufficiently large, the agents in a team can achieve perfect coordination, i.e., behave like a fully centralized agent, as the signal can implicitly designate the actions each agent should take. Therefore, this signal can extend the joint policy space to the same as that in a fully centralized approach. To encourage agents to follow instructions of the signal, we introduce an information-theoretic regularization, which maximizes the mutual information between signal variables and joint policies.
Our SIC can be easily integrated with most existing mod-els with policy networks, and we combine SIC with decentralized algorithms to evaluate it. We first conduct experiments on a variant of Rock-Paper-Scissors-Well matrix game (StackExchange 2013) to demonstrate how SIC incentivize agents to correlate their individual policies both in one-step and multi-step scenarios. Then we conduct experiments on a mixed cooperative-competitive game, i.e., Predator-Prey, based on multi-agent particle worlds (Lowe et al. 2017) .
The experimental results show that by adopting SIC, agents learn to coordinate by interpreting the signal differently and improves their performance significantly. We also use case studies to analyze the improvement, and conduct parameter sensitivity analysis.
Methods

Markov Games
We formulate the studied scenarios as Markov games that consist of N agents. At timestep t, the i-th agent uses its own stochastic policy π θi ∈ P D 1 (A i ) S , i.e., π θi : S → P D(A i ), to choose its action a it ∈ A given current state s ∈ S, where π θi is parameterized by θ i . For simplicity, we abbreviate π θi to π i . After the joint action is taken, the environment proceeds to the next state according to the transition probability distribution, T : S × A → P D(S), and returns individual rewards r it : S × A → R to each agent. The objective of each agent is to maximize its own total expected return J(π i ) = E s∼T ,ai∼πi [R i ] within a limited time horizon T , where R i = T t=0 γ t r it and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discounting factor. We use a subscript i to denote the quantity of the i-th agent, and use no subscript and −i to denote the joint quantities over all agents and agents except the i-th agent respectively.
Team Competition Games
We define the team competition game as a special case of Markov games, where N agents are separated into two teams, with M agents in team A and N − M agents in team B. Each team shares common rewards, i.e., r 1t = r 2t = · · · = r M t = r At and r (M +1)t = r (M +2)t = · · · = r N t = r Bt hold for every agent in both teams. Obviously, for two agents i and j in team A, we have R i = R j = R A , where R A is the team return, and it is the same case for team B. In team competition, rewards of two teams are conflicted, i.e., r At + λr Bt = 0 holds for every timestep t, where λ is a positive coefficient. Many scenarios can be regarded as examples of team competition games. For instance, in Star-Craft micromanagement tasks (Peng et al. 2017) , two teams fight against each other to survive. Without loss of generality, we use team A to continue our analysis.
We denote the joint action of a team as a ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A M . The joint policy casts a distribution over the joint action space, and we denote it as π ∈ P D(A) = Π. In particular, we denote joint policy of team A and team B as µ and ν. In the fully centralized paradigm, we can view a team 1 P D(X) is a probability distribution of variable X, and P D(X) Y is a mapping from the space of Y to the space of probability distributions of X. of agents as a meta-player. Obviously, we have a M = a, and µ M = µ, where a M and µ M are action and policy of the meta-player, which we name as meta-action and metapolicy. Therefore, the meta-policy space, Π M , is equal to Π. In the popular decentralized execution scheme, a team of agents makes decisions independently according to their individual policies π i . We define the team-policy of agents in team A, µ T , as a Cartesian product of their individual policies, i.e.,
The meta-policy space is larger than the team-policy space. Every team-policy will cast a distribution on all possible joint actions, and we can find a distribution in a metapolicy space equivalent to the team-policy by definition. On the contrary, not all meta-policies can find their corresponding elements in the team-policy space. Consider a twoagent system with individual action spaces as {a, b} and {x, y}. we cannot find a team-policy that satisfies P ( a, y ) = P ( b, x ) = 0 if both agents are making decisions independently. When there is another team in the environment, the objective of training is in fact finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) between the two teams. We use δ = µ, ν ∈ P D(A 1 ×· · ·× A M ) S × P D(A M +1 × · · · × A N ) S ) to denote a Nash equilibrium where every one takes a best response to the strategy of others. We define the set of NEs team A can achieve in a centralized way as ∆ M , with M indicating the meta-policy space, and the set of NEs achieved in a decentralized way as ∆ T , with T indicating the team-policy space. Note that definitions of ∆ M and ∆ T do not assume the policy space of team B, so the agents in team B can act in either decentralized or centralized way. We conclude that Theorem 1. ∆ M and ∆ T may have intersection but are not ensured to contain each other.
We prove it as:
i If agents in team A plays in a centralized way, the reached δ = µ M , ν is an element of ∆ M by definition. In this situation, if the adopted µ M can be decomposed into fully decentralized individual policies, then δ is also an element of ∆ T . Otherwise, we say µ M is not feasible in the teampolicy space, and ∆ T does not include δ. ii If agents in team A plays in a decentralized way, δ = µ T , ν is an element of ∆ T . However, team A only explores a subset of joint policy space to reach δ, that is, µ T is the best joint policy team A can take within the teampolicy space given ν. If we enlarge the joint policy space by substituting them with a meta-player, µ T , ν may no longer be a NE, since both team A and team B may find a better response and establish a new NE, δ . If δ = δ, then δ is also an element of ∆ M . Otherwise, it only belongs to ∆ T . To measure the value of different NE δ, we can compute the expected return of current joint policy, µ, since ν is fixed. We denote the game value of a NE δ as σ A (δ) = J(µ|ν). We can compute game values for all NEs in ∆ M and ∆ T , and construct sets of game values as Σ M and Σ T correspondingly. It is easy to derive Theorem 2. We illustrate relationships among different sets in Fig. 1 . Theorem 2. Σ M and Σ T may have intersection but are not ensured to contain each other.
Since the meta-policy space is larger than the team-policy space, it is always possible to find the equivalent meta-policy of the team-policy, and the meta-policy may be improved by changing itself in the larger space. Therefore, it is always better to reach a NE in the meta-policy space instead of the team-policy space, regardless of the opponent team's policy. To extend the joint policy space, we need to increase correlation among agents' policies. Previous works (Sukhbaatar, Fergus, and others 2016; Peng et al. 2017; Jiang and Lu 2018; Iqbal and Sha 2018) propose to introduce the communication mechanism, which encourages agents to coordinate by exchanging communication vectors. However, in communication agents have to execute three tasks to accomplish successful coordination: sending meaningful signals (signaling), receiving the right signal (receiving), and interpreting it correctly (listening). (Jiang and Lu 2018) points out that the receiving process suffers from the noisy channel problem (Jiang and Lu 2018) , which arises when all other agents use the same communication channel to simultaneously send information to one agent, and the agent needs to distinguish useful information from useless or irrelevant noise. In addition, (Lowe et al. 2019) shows that positive signaling does not necessarily lead to positive listening. Therefore, it is not easy to explore better joint policy through communication in complex scenarios.
Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC)
We propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), which maintains the decentralized execution scheme for ease of training and extends the joint policy space to the same as the meta-policy space. SIC introduces a common signal sent to every agent in the same team as an extension of observations, and uses it to coordinate cooperative agents in the team competition. The signal works like the correlation device in correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974; Leyton-Brown and Shoham 2008) , and is expected to instruct each agent the action to take in current state.
The usage of signal extends the team-policy space to a larger one, which we denote as the SIC-policy space, Π SIC . By assuming that all agents follow the instruction of a signal z ∈ R Dz = Z, and Z is sufficiently large, where Z is the signal space, we derive Theorem 3. Theorem 3. Π SIC is equal to Π M .
In the worst case, the size of signal space needs to be equal to that of the meta-action space to ensure this equivalence. However, in practice, we can lower this complexity by approximating it with neural networks. Similarly, we define the set of NEs team A can achieve adopting SIC in a decentralized way as ∆ SIC , and compute a set of corresponding game values as Σ SIC . We conclude that Theorem 4. ∆ M and ∆ T are subsets of ∆ SIC .
We prove it as: if all agents follow the instruction, according to Theorem 3 we can find the corresponding SIC-policy of the meta-policy in each NE of ∆ M ; if all agents do not follow the instruction (or the signal space is an empty set) and act independently, it is equivalent to the fully decentralized scheme; if only some of the agents follow the instruction, a new joint policy space is generated, and some NEs may be found that are neither in ∆ M nor in ∆ T . Therefore, by adopting SIC, we are ensured to find NE in ∆ M theoretically, which is better than previous decentralized approaches. Similarly, we conclude Theorem 5. We also illustrate relationships between them in Fig. 1 . Theorem 5. Σ M and Σ T are subsets of Σ SIC .
In this paper we use a signal sampled randomly from a distribution z ∼ P z , P z = N (0, I Dz×Dz ), and leave the interpretation of signal to each agent. A similar concept to random signal is random noise, which is also sampled from some distribution and mostly regarded as a factor to encourage exploration in MARL domain. Our random signal differs from random noise in two aspects. Firstly, random signal is used as an extension to local observations, and works both in training and execution. Secondly, random signal is shared among teammates and fixed during an episode of games.
The critical issue in applying random signal for coordination is how to incentivize agents to take coordinated actions based on the signal. As random signal itself carries no explicit information, it is possible for agents to treat it as random noise and ignores it during the training process. To resolve this issue and to help agents to learn to exploit the signal, we introduce an information-theoretic regularization to ensure the signal makes an impact in agents' decision making. In detail, this regularization aims to maximize the mutual information between the signal, z, and the joint policy, µ, given current state, s, as
where P (·|s, a) is the posterior distribution estimating the probability of z after seeing the state s and the joint action a. As we have no knowledge of the posterior, we circumvent it by introducing a variational lower bound (Barber and Agakov 2003; Chen et al. 2016; Li, Song, and Ermon 2017) which defines an auxiliary distribution U (·|s, a) as: 
where U (·|s, a) is an approximation of P (·|s, a). Since z is sampled from a fixed distribution, H(z) acts as a constant term during training. Therefore, we derive a mutual information loss (MI loss) from Eq. 2 as
where τ is trajectories of game episodes. One obvious advantage of SIC is that it can be easily integrated with most existing models with policy networks, as shown in Fig. 2 . We use a centralized multi-layer feedforward network, named as U-Net, to compute the value of U (z|s, a) as a function of z and z , where z is the output of U-Net with the same dimension as z. U (z|s, a) is measured by the mean squared error between z and z. Minimizing L I is expected to optimize parameters of policy networks and U-net concurrently. However, if agents adopt stochastic policies, it is challenging to pass gradients to policy networks through randomly selected a. Therefore, we use a simplified approximation U (z|s, h), where h is the concatenation of inputs to the last layer of policy networks of all cooperative agents. SIC follows the framework of centralized training with decentralized execution. Parameters of individual policies, θ i , are optimized by ascent with the gradient as:
where A(o i , a i |z) is the advantage function, α > 0 is the hyperparameter for entropy term, and β > 0 is the hyperparameter for information maximization term. In addition, parameters of centralized U-net, ω, is optimized as
Note that o i may be a partial observation of agent i, and additional communication mechanism can be introduced to ensure theoretical correctness in Eq. 3. However, we empirically show that in some partially observable environment where the agent may infer global state from its local observation, SIC can still work with o i . We optimize parameters of policy networks and U-Net concurrently as shown in Fig. 2 . When applied to Multi-agent Actor-Critic frameworks (Lowe et al. 2017) , the objective of updating critic remains unchanged.
Experiments One-step Matrix Game
We use a matrix game, named as Rock-Paper-Scissors-Well (StackExchange 2013). which is an extension to traditional Rock-Paper-Scissors game and can be viewed as an abstraction to many complex games. We use a variant of the matrix with two teams of agents. Each team consists of two independent agents, and the available actions of each agent are Access(A) and Y ield(Y ). The joint action space consists of (Y, Y ), (Y, A), (A, Y ), and (A, A),. The payoff matrix is presented in Tab. 1. Assume each team are controlled by a meta-player, the best meta-policy with the highest game value is P (Y, Y ) = P (Y, A) = P (A, Y ) = 1 3 and P (A, A) = 0, since it is always better to take (Y, A) instead of (A, A). To achieve this, agents within the same team need to coordinate to avoid the disadvantaged joint action, i.e., (A, A), and choose others uniformly randomly. 
Y, Y (0, 0) (1, -1) (-1, 1) (1, -1) Y, A (-1, 1) (0, 0) (1, -1) (1, -1) A, Y (1, -1) (-1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, 1) A, A (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0)
We apply our SIC module to REINFORCE algorithm, and denote it as SIC-RE. The team-shared random signal z ∈ R 2 is sampled from N (0, I). Note that each agent takes a stochastic policy, and signals received by the two teams are different. Parameters are not shared among agents. During training, rewards of both row players and column players gradually converge to 0. Fig. 3 illustrates the joint policy of both teams. We randomly sample 5000 signals and test how agents respond to them before and after training. We can see that i Before training, the frequency of each joint action is roughly 0.25 for both team, and the distribution of signals triggering different joint actions are quite spreading. In addition, each agent takes a random individual policy. ii After training, the joint policy of both teams reach their own ideal state. The signal space is roughly divided into three "zones", with each zone representing one joint action. The "area" of each zone, i.e., the probability of sampling one signal from the zone, is roughly 1/3, which is consistent with intuition. This result is close to the best performance a meta-player can achieve.
Multi-step Matrix Game
We extend the single-step matrix game to a multi-step one. We denote the matrix game in Tab. 1 as M 4 , since we expect the fourth joint action to be deprecated by agents. Then we generate a new matrix, M i , by exchanging the fourth row with the i-th row, and the fourth column with the i-th column sequentially. In this way we obtain a set of matrices M = {M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 }. We design a multi-step matrix game, where two teams play according to a random payoff matrix drawn from M in each step, except that it is always M 1 in the first step. Each agent can only observe the ID i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} of the current matrix and the random signal. Note that to simulate sparse rewards, we only give agents the sum of rewards on each step after a game is over, and train them with discounted returns. We set the number of steps to be 4. To evaluate SIC-RE, we use REINFORCE algorithm with fully independent agents as the baseline model, which we denote as IND-RE.
We conduct experiments and plot averaged reward curves of 
Predator-Prey
To extend our conclusions to more complex environments, we conduct experiments on Predator-Prey games (Benda, Jagannathan, and Dodhiawala 1986; Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) , a classic task to study coordination where a team of agents, predators, to collide with another team of agents, preys. We adapt the environment in (Lowe et al. 2017 ) to a team competition variant. Our variant consists of M slow predators, and M fast preys in a randomly generated environment with L = 2 large landmarks impeding the way. In the team competition setting, whenever a collision happens, all predators are rewarded while all preys are penalized simultaneously. We pack the position and velocity of an object as its attributes, and an agent observe its own absolute attributes and egocentric attributes of other agents and landmarks. Other settings of environments remain the same as in (Lowe et al. 2017) .
We use two recently proposed approaches as baselines: MADDPG (Lowe et al. 2017) and COMA (Foerster et al. 2018b) . We integrate SIC with baselines and denote them as SIC-MA and SIC-COMA. We follow original hyperparameters of neural networks like the number of units and activation functions and inherit them in SIC variants. We also conduct ablation analysis of mutual information loss by remove L i from SIC-MA, and denote it as SIC-MA (w/oL I ). To evaluate the performance of different models, we conduct cross-comparison among them and report predator scores with 10 random seeds. In detail, during training predators and preys are controlled by the same model, and in evaluation, we use all kinds of predators to compete against 2 and 3 , where the bold value is the highest score in a row, while the underlined value is the lowest score in a column. We can see that:
i SIC-MADDPG significantly outperforms all other models, both as predators and preys. In addition, the application of SIC presents stable improvements when integrated into different models.
ii Ablation analysis shows that L I is a strong constraint to enforce agents to coordinate. Absence of L I is harmful to the performance of models, although minor improvements may be observed.
Understanding what kind of role signal plays is no mean feat in this environment, as the policy space is high dimensional, and the situation of the game changes rapidly from timestep to timestep. We manage to conduct a case study as shown in Fig. 5 . We repeat MADDPG vs. MADDPG, SIC-MA vs. MADDPG and MADDPG vs. SIC-MA for 10000 games with different seeds. We start each game from the same initial environment, and collect positions of collisions in the total 250000 steps. We plot the density distribution of positions, (x, y) and marginal distributions of x and y as well as the initial environment in Fig. 5 . Positions with higher frequency in collected data are colored darker in the plane, and the value of its components in marginal distributions is higher. Note that color and height reflect density instead of the number of times, and cannot be compared between sub-figures directly. In Fig. 5-a , most collisions happen in the top or right parts around the upper landmark, which reflects quite fixed policies of both predators and preys as running to the top-left corner. When SIC-MA plays preys, the collision areas spread from the middle part to the bottom part of the whole map; when SIC-MA plays predators, collisions also appears in more diverse positions, and we observe that the right predator sometimes drive preys into the aisle between two landmarks, where the left predator is ambushing to capture them. SIC-MA find better joint policies both as predators and preys. What's more, their various strategies are helpful to achieve a better result. 3806 and 2041 collisions happen with SIC-MA as predators and preys respectively, while 3068 collisions happen when MADDPG plays against MADDPG.
Parameter Sensitivity
Theoretically, one-dimension continuous signals on the realvalue domain can represent an arbitrary number of information. However, considering the limited capacity of neural networks to interpret the signal in practice, it is meaningful to use high-dimensional signals to make training easier. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the influence of the key hyper-parameter, the dimension of the signal D z . We conduct a parameter sensitivity analysis by testing SIC-MA vs MADDPG with different D z in 2 vs 2 predator-prey environment, and report results in Fig. 6 . Note that SIC-MA with D z = 0 is equal to MADDPG, and D z = 20 is the setting used in Tab. 2 and 3. We can see that SIC-MA presents a stable improvement over MADDPG. Most importantly, although in D z = 25 is the worst case to ensure Theorem 3, empirical results show that approximation through neural networks can compress Z and ensure good performance.
Related Works
Unlike previous studies (Busoniu, Babuska, and De Schutter 2008) on MARL that adopt tabular methods and focus on coordination in simple environments, recent works adopt deep reinforcement learning framework (Li 2017 ) and turn to complex scenarios with high dimensional state and action spaces like particle worlds (Lowe et al. 2017 ) and Star-Craft II (Vinyals et al. 2017 ). Among different approaches to model the controlling of agents, centralized training with decentralized execution (Oliehoek, Spaan, and Vlassis 2008; Lowe et al. 2017) outperforms others for circumventing the exponential growth of joint action space and the nonstationary environment problem (Li 2017) . Emergent communication (Lowe et al. 2019 ) is proposed to enhance coordination and training stability. Communication allows agents to pass messages between agents and "share" their observations via communication vectors. It is essential to cooperative referential games (Foerster et al. 2016; (x, y) , in 10000 repeated games. We repeat experiments from the same randomly generated environment, with yellow, green and black circles representing predators, preys and landmarks at the start of each game. 2017), or the non-situated environment (Wagner et al. 2003) , where each agent has its own specialization as speaker or listener and the exchange of information is crucial to the games. A more widely-studied type of environments is the situated environment, where agents have similar roles and non-communicative actions. (Sukhbaatar, Fergus, and others 2016; Peng et al. 2017) design special architectures to share information among all agents. The noisy channel problem arises when all other agents use the same communication channel to send information simultaneously, and the agent needs to distinguish useful information from useless or irrelevant noise. To alleviate this problem, (Jiang and Lu 2018; Das et al. 2018; Iqbal and Sha 2018) propose to introduce the attention mechanism to control the bandwidth of different agents dynamically. However, communication requires large bandwidth to exchange information, and the effectiveness of communication is under question as discussed by (Lowe et al. 2019) .
The coordination problem (Boutilier 1999) , or the Pareto-Selection problem (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) , has been discussed by a series of works in fully cooperative environments. The solution to the coordination problem requires strong coordination among agents, i.e., all agents act as if in a fully centralized way. In the game theory domain, it can also be viewed as pursuing Correlated equilibrium (CE) (Leyton-Brown and Shoham 2008; Aumann 1974) , where agents make decisions following instructions from a correlation device. It is desired that agents in the system can establish correlation protocols through adaptive learning method instead of constructing a correlation device manually for specific tasks (Greenwald, Hall, and Serrano 2003) proposes to replace the value function in Q-learning with a new one reflecting agents' rewards according to some CE. (Zhang and Lesser 2013) maintains coordination sets and select coordinated actions within these sets. Apart from these methods, centralized signal is adopted by a variety of works (Cigler and Faltings 2011; Cigler and Faltings 2013; Farina et al. 2018) .
A similar concept is common knowledge, which refers to common information, e.g., representations of states, among partially observable agents. Common knowledge is used to enhance coordination (Thomas et al. 2014; Foerster et al. 2018a ) and combined with communication (Korkmaz et al. 2014 ). Among them, (Foerster et al. 2018a) proposes MACKRL which introduces a random seed as part of common knowledge to guide a hierarchical policy tree. To avoid exponential growth of model complexity, MACKRL restricts correlation to pre-defined patterns, e.g., a pairwise one, which is too rigid for complex tasks.
Conclusions
We propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel module to enhance coordination of agents' policies in centralized training with decentralized execution framework, SIC instructs agents by sampling and sending common signals to cooperative agents in team competition games, and incentivize their coordination by enforcing a mutual information constraint. Our analysis show with the help of SIC, the joint policy of decentralized agents demonstrates better performance.
Visualization for Joint Policy of Multi-step Matrix Game
We plot the curves of joint policies of both row players and column players in multi-step matrix games in Fig. 7, 8 , and 9.
Experimental Results 2v2 Predator-Prey Experiment
In 2v2 Predator-Prey experiment, we adopt 5 different models: MADDPG, SIC-MADDPG, Ablation, COMA, SIC-COMA. For both MADDPG and SIC-MADDPG, we use the same hyperparameters with the original MADDPG paper except for the learning rate which is set to be 0.001 for MADDPG and 0.0005 for SIC-MADDPG. In SIC-MADDPG, we add a 20-dimensional signal, a U-Net with a ReLU MLP with 64 hidden units, and set the coefficient of MI loss to be 0.0001. The Ablation has the same hyper-parameters with SIC-MADDPG, with the exception of removing the MI loss.
In COMA, we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.00005. Gradient clipping is set to be 0.1. Both Actor and Critic are parameterized by a two-layer ReLU MLP with 64 units per layer which is the same with MADDPG. We adopt GAE with γ = 0.99 and λ = 0.8. We use a batch size of 1000. SIC-COMA adopts the same hyper-parameters as in COMA and the same signal, U-Net and MI loss with SIC-MADDPG.
For all models, we train with 10 random seeds.
4v4 Predator-Prey Experiment
In 4v4 Predator-Prey experiment, We adopt the same models and parameters with 2v2 case, with the modifications as follows:
The learning rates of MADDPG and SIC-MADDPG are both set to be 0.0005. The coefficient of MI loss in SIC-MADDPG is set to be 0.01 in 4v4 case.
Matrix Game Experiment
We conduct three multi-step matrix game experiments: SIC vs SIC, SIC vs IND, IND vs IND. For both SIC and IND models, we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001. The policy network is parameterized by a one-layer ReLU MLP with 8 hidden units. We use a batch size of 100000. For SIC models, we use, a two-layer ReLU MLP with 8 hidden units as U-Net, and set the coefficient of MI loss to be 0.01.
Algorithm 1 SIC-MADDPG Algorithm for episode = 1 to M do Initialize a random process N for action exploration Receive initial state x Generate random signal z according to pre-defined distribution. for t = 1 to max-episode-length do for each agent i, sample action a i according to π i (a i |o i , z) + N t Execute actions a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) and observe reward r and new state x Store (x, a, r, x , z j ) in replay buffer D x ← x for k = 1 to 2 do Sample a random mini-batch of S samples (x j , a j , r j , x j , z j ) from D for agent i in team k do Calculate h j k by concatenating inputs to the last layer of policy networks of all cooperative agents in team k Calculate U j k = U (z j k |x j k , h j k ) Set y j = r j i + γQ π i (x j , π k )| a k =π k (σ j k )
Update critic by minimizing the loss L (θ i ) = 1 S j (y j − Q π i (x j , π j k )) 2
Update actor using the sampled policy gradient 
